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THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TAX PENALTY
Jeffrey H. Kahn*
In 2010, President Obama signed legislation that significantly altered the health-
care and health insurance markets in the United States. An integral part of that
reform is the individual mandate, a provision that requires individuals to
purchase and maintain healthcare insurance. Failure to maintain such coverage
subjects an individual to a tax penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of that provision under Congress’s taxing power.
Despite the Supreme Court upholding the individual mandate, fundamental ques-
tions remain. This Article addresses the question of whether the use of a tax penalty
to encourage taxpayers to do something that the government desires is normatively a
bad policy. Many commentators have contended that a tax penalty is economically
equivalent to the current tax system’s use of deductions and credits to encourage
behavior. This Article argues that despite some similarity, there are major differ-
ences between the two that should lead Congress to reconsider the desirability of
using a tax penalty approach in the future. This Article also considers whether the
use of the Internal Revenue Service to administer and enforce a penalty that has
little to do with the correct baseline of income will have an adverse effect on general
tax compliance.
This Article explores the individual mandate tax penalty in detail. It explains the
mechanics of the tax penalty provision and points out several ambiguities in the
provision that will likely require clarification. It also explores whether the extent of
some of the problems in the healthcare system at which the mandate is aimed have
been exaggerated. The Article concludes that Congress should reexamine the pros
and cons and unintended consequences of using a tax penalty to induce behavior
before going down a similar road.
INTRODUCTION
Arguably, President Obama’s key legislative success during his
first term was the passage of a historic overhaul of the United States
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healthcare system.1 Both at the time of its enactment and today,
one of the most discussed provisions of the Healthcare Reform Acts
is the “individual mandate,” a provision that requires most individu-
als to have healthcare insurance that provides “minimum essential
coverage.”2 Unless exempted, any individual that does not have
such health insurance is subject to a tax “penalty,” which is payable
on the individual’s income tax return.3 The Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.) itself repeatedly refers to this imposition as a “penalty.” For
convenience, this imposition is hereinafter referred to as an “insur-
ance penalty,” a “tax penalty,” or simply a “penalty.”
Some (including the attorney generals of several states) argued
that the healthcare bill in general and the individual mandate pro-
vision in particular were unconstitutional.4 However, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate as a
valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power.5 This Article does not dis-
cuss the constitutionality of the mandate.6 Nor does it examine the
merits and costs of the Healthcare Reform Acts. This Article does
address whether it is appropriate to put the penalty provision in the
tax code and whether normatively it is a good strategy to utilize a
penalty, enforced by the Internal Revenue Service (Service), to
pressure individuals to make a purchase that the government con-
siders to be desirable. Although the Supreme Court resolved the
constitutional issue, the question of the desirability of using a tax
1. On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). On March 30, 2010, President
Obama signed into law the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. Pub. L.
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. Together these two bills encompass the healthcare reform,
which some critics have referred to as Obamacare, and some persons refer to the two acts in
the singular as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Throughout this Article, the overall reform
will be referred to as the “Healthcare Reform Acts.”
2. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, I.R.C. § 5000A(a) (2011).
3. Id. § 5000A(b).
4. Prior to the decision by the Supreme Court, there were mixed results. Compare Flor-
ida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
individual mandate provision was beyond the scope of Congress’s powers), with Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding the provision), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (same).
5. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
6. Prior to the Supreme Court decision, some professors argued that the mandate was
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual
Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010); Steven J.
Willis & Nakku Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES 169 (2010).
Others argued that the mandate was constitutional. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation
and the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010), http://yalelaw
journal.org/2010/5/31/galle.html; David B. Rivkin, Jr., et al., Debate, A Healthy Debate: The
Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV ONLINE. 93, 102 (2009), http://
www.pennlawreview.com/debates/index.php?id=23.
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penalty (in contrast to either using a tax deduction or credit, hav-
ing another agency administer the penalty, or imposing a fee that is
not designated as a penalty) continues to be a live issue.
It appears that the provision in question is the first to directly
impose additional taxation on an individual for failure to purchase
an item. Still, some have questioned whether the provision is
unique—i.e., whether it is economically equivalent to providing a
deduction or credit to encourage specified expenditures.7 This Arti-
cle will question whether deductions and credits in the current
system are equivalent or even similar to a penalty system. It will also
examine whether provisions, such as the social security tax, are
comparable to the newly adopted insurance penalty.
Additionally, this Article considers whether the use of tax law to
penalize people for not buying medical insurance will adversely af-
fect taxpayers’ willingness to comply voluntarily with regular tax
provisions, and concludes that it likely will. That harm, plus the ad-
ditional stress that the adoption of this provision places upon the
administration of the tax system, should have been weighed before
the Service was chosen as the agency to administer the program.
Although the availability of an already existing tax system makes it
convenient to use that system to collect the penalty, if that conve-
nience were weighed against the harm that the tax system may
suffer, Congress may have chosen another approach. At least it
would have been comforting to know that Congress had considered
the issue before it acted, rather than having gone forth blindly in-
different to those potential consequences.8
Part I of the Article covers the mechanics of the individual man-
date. It briefly describes the actual provision of the individual
mandate that was added to the I.R.C. and explains how that provi-
sion operates. As will be illustrated, the technical drafting of the
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. There is very little legislative history available for the Healthcare Reform Acts, and
none of it suggests that Congress considered the possible harm to the overall tax system:
As a result of the unusual procedures used to enact the ACA, there is little definitive
legislative history of the law. What exists is predominantly limited to Senate Floor
debate of the ACA, and House and Senate floor debate of HCERA. No conference
report exists. The Senate-passed version, which became law, was primarily the product
of a melding of two Senate Committee bills by the Senate Democratic leadership. Of
the two reporting Committees, the HELP Committee did not issue report language
explaining the provisions. Although the Senate Finance Committee issued a report
explaining provisions of the legislation reported from its Committee, it did not in-
clude actual legislative language in the report.
Katherine Hayes, Overview of Policy, Procedure, and Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act, 7
NAELA J. 1, 9 (2011).
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Acts is atrocious, and serious gaps and ambiguities abound.9 Part II
of the Article briefly discusses the Supreme Court decision uphold-
ing the individual mandate, focusing on the discussion of whether
the mandate should be considered a tax or a penalty. Part III de-
scribes the purpose of the mandate. Part IV discusses the
contention that the insurance penalty provision is neither unprece-
dented nor unique. Commentators have compared the insurance
penalty to other tax provisions involving deductions and credits and
have argued that there is no meaningful economic distinction be-
tween them. Part V discusses whether a penalty is appropriate in
this circumstance and, if so, whether the tax law is a poor choice as
the vehicle for applying the penalty. The Article ends with conclu-
sions and suggestions.
I. THE MECHANICS OF I.R.C. § 5000A10
I.R.C. § 5000A requires certain individuals, referred to as “appli-
cable individuals,” to maintain “minimum essential coverage” for
each month after the close of the year 2013.11 Minimum essential
coverage includes coverage under, among others, Medicare, Medi-
caid, plans purchased in the individual market, and employer-
sponsored plans.12 In any month in which the minimum essential
coverage is not maintained for a taxpayer who is an applicable indi-
vidual or for those of his dependents who are applicable
individuals, the taxpayer will be subject to a “penalty.”13 The I.R.C.
itself describes this imposition as a “penalty” throughout § 5000A.14
A taxpayer who has dependents is liable for any penalties imposed
on those dependents; the I.R.C. does not expressly state whether
the dependent also is liable to pay his penalty if the taxpayer fails to
do so.15
9. See generally Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Operation of the Individual Mandate, 132 TAX NOTES
521 (2011).
10. Much of this Part derives from Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Operation of the Individual
Mandate. Id.
11. I.R.C. § 5000A(a), (d) (2011). Some individuals, such as a non-U.S. citizen present
in the United States, are exempted from this requirement. Id. § 5000A(d).
12. Id. § 5000A(f).
13. See id. § 5000A(b).
14. See, e.g., id. § 5000A(b), (c), (e).
15. See id. § 5000A(b)(3)(A). One ground for finding that such a dependent is not
jointly liable is to contrast the dependent provision, which makes no mention of joint liabil-
ity, with the comparable provision for spouses that file a joint return on whom the I.R.C.
expressly imposes joint liability. Compare id., with id. § 5000A(b)(3)(B). The express imposi-
tion of joint liability in one provision and the lack of a mention in the comparable provision
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Interestingly, failure to pay this penalty is not subject to any crim-
inal prosecution or penalty, and the Service may not file any lien or
levy any property in order to collect it.16 It appears that the sole way
that the Service can collect the penalty from those who refuse to
pay is to withhold any tax refund to which they might become
entitled.17
The I.R.C. provides a number of exemptions from characteriza-
tion as an applicable individual, and persons who qualify for those
exemptions are not required to purchase minimum essential insur-
ance coverage.18 For example, incarcerated individuals and persons
who adhere to a religion whose tenets or teachings cause them to
conscientiously oppose the benefits of insurance are exempt.19
In addition to the characterization as an applicable individual ex-
emption, the I.R.C. exempts certain applicable individuals from the
penalty.20 Along with four specific exemptions from the penalty,
there is a general provision exempting applicable individuals for
whom the government determines that their purchase of coverage
would be a hardship.21 The Healthcare Reform Acts also established
federal tax credits for insurance premiums paid by individuals and
families with household income between 133 percent and 400 per-
cent of the federal poverty line.22
To provide relief for short-term gaps in coverage, the I.R.C. does
not impose a penalty if a person fails to have the minimum essential
coverage for a continuous period of less than three months.23 Such
a continuous period can consist of months that fall within two cal-
endar years.24 If there is more than one such continuous period in a
for dependents suggests that there is not joint liability in the latter case. The answer is far
from clear.
16. Id. § 5000A(g)(2).
17. See Questions and Answers on the Individual Shared Responsibility Provision, IRS, http://
www.irs.gov/uac/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-Individual-Shared-Responsibility-Provision
(last updated Sept. 24, 2013).
18. I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2)–(4), (e).
19. See id. § 5000A(d)(2), (4).
20. Id. § 5000A(e).
21. Id. § 5000A(e)(5).
22. Id. § 36B. Medicaid was also expanded to cover more individuals and families. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2006).
23. See I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(4).
24. Id. § 5000A(e)(4)(B)(i).
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calendar year, only the first such period qualifies for the exclu-
sion.25 If the continuous period lasts for three months or more,
then there is no exception to the imposition of the penalty.26
Subject to a limitation described below,27 the annual amount of
the penalty is equal to the sum of the “monthly penalty amounts”
that the taxpayer incurs for each month that the taxpayer, or any
dependent of the taxpayer who is an applicable individual, is not in
compliance with coverage.28 If the taxpayer files a joint return, then
the taxpayer and the spouse are jointly liable for “such penalty.”29
The monthly penalty amount is one-twelfth of the greater of either
(1) a fixed “flat dollar amount” or (2) an amount based on a per-
centage of the taxpayer’s household income.30 The definition of
“household income” is described later in this Article.31
The flat dollar amount is determined by reference to an “applica-
ble dollar amount” that is established in the I.R.C.32 The flat dollar
amount for each applicable individual is equal to the sum of the
applicable dollar amounts for that individual and for others who
are not clearly identified in the statute.33 The statute describes the
flat dollar amount of a taxpayer for a month as the “sum of the
applicable dollar amounts for all individuals with respect to whom
such failure occurred during such month.”34 Obviously, there needs
to be a modifying limitation on the word “individuals” in that provi-
sion to clarify which individuals have their applicable dollar
amounts added to the taxpayer’s. By referring to other subsections
of the statute, it seems clear that the reference is to dependents of
the taxpayer who are applicable individuals and who failed to have
25. For example, if a taxpayer did not have appropriate insurance coverage for the
months of January and November in one calendar year, but did have coverage for all other
months of that year, this exception would apply only to exclude the penalty for the January
month. It would apply the penalty for November even though the total lack of coverage
during the year was two months. See id. § 5000A(e)(4)(B)(iii).
26. Id. § 5000A(e)(4). Note that no exemption is provided for any month during the
period. That is, once the taxpayer exceeds three months, the penalty applies to all such
months, not just the months in excess of three. Id. § 5000A(e)(4)(B)(ii). Also note that Con-
gress delegated authority to the Treasury to issue regulations on how to apply the penalty
when the continuous period of less than three months includes months in more than one
taxable year. See id. § 5000A(e)(4)(B).
27. See infra text accompanying note 49.
28. I.R.C. § 5000A(c). A dependent of a taxpayer is a person who comes within the
definition set forth in I.R.C. § 152.
29. Id. § 5000A(b)(3)(B). The provision is unclear as to what “such penalty” refers to in
cases with joint returns. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 526.
30. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 43–46.
32. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(A), (3).
33. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(A)(i).
34. Id.
WINTER 2014] The Individual Mandate Tax Penalty 325
adequate health insurance coverage,35 but the Service’s future con-
struction may be different. For the year 2016, the applicable dollar
amount will be $695.36 If an individual is under the age of eighteen
at the beginning of a month, the individual’s applicable dollar
amount for that month will be reduced by fifty percent.37
For a taxpayer who has no dependents, the flat dollar amount
will be equal to the applicable dollar amount and so will be $695 for
the year 2016. Thus, in 2016, the monthly flat dollar penalty
amount for such a taxpayer will be $57.92. After 2016, this amount
will be adjusted for cost of living.38
Although the total flat dollar amount of an individual who has
such dependents is the cumulative total of the applicable dollar
amounts of all of them, there is a ceiling on the size of the flat
dollar amount for the year. It cannot exceed three times the
amount of the applicable dollar amount.39 Consequently, a tax-
payer’s flat dollar amount for the year 2016 cannot exceed $2,085.40
After computing the flat dollar amount for the monthly penalty,
one must calculate the percentage on the taxpayer’s household in-
come for the monthly penalty to determine which figure is larger.
To calculate the percentage of household income variable for 2016,
the taxpayer multiplies modified family income by 2.5 percent.41
Modified family income is the excess of the taxpayer’s “household
income” over “the amount of gross income specified in section
6012(a)(1)”42—i.e., the minimum amount of income that requires
a taxpayer to file a tax return. “Household income” is the sum of a
35. As shown later, this is contrasted with the fact that the household income of a tax-
payer includes the income of all dependents who are required to file an income tax return
regardless of whether they are applicable individuals who are not in compliance with the
mandate.
36. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(A). Although $695 is the applicable dollar amount, it is not
fully phased in until 2016. The applicable dollar amount for 2014 is ninety-five dollars, and
the amount for 2015 is $325. Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(B). The flat dollar amount can be greater
than the $695 applicable dollar amount for 2016 because it will include the applicable dollar
amount for each of the taxpayer’s dependents who are subject to the penalty. See id.
§ 5000A(c)(2)(A). For years after 2016, the applicable amount will be adjusted for changes
in the cost of living. Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(D).
37. Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(C).
38. Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(D).
39. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(A)(ii).
40. Of course, the taxpayer’s actual penalty could be higher because the percentage of
income variable could be greater than this maximum flat dollar amount.
41. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(B). Similar to the flat dollar amount, this rate is not fully
phased in until 2016. For 2014, the rate will be one percent, and for 2015 it will be two
percent. Id.
42. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B).
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modified amount of the adjusted gross income43 of the taxpayer44
and each dependent of the taxpayer who qualifies the taxpayer for
an exemption deduction under I.R.C. § 15145 and who is required
to file a tax return.46 I.R.C. § 6012 is the provision that requires
taxpayers to file a tax return unless their gross income does not
exceed a certain amount.47 For example, for joint filing taxpayers,
that amount is equal to twice the personal exemption amount listed
in I.R.C. § 151(d), plus the standard deduction for joint filing
taxpayers.48
Thus, the monthly penalty amount will be one-twelfth of the
greater of those two calculations: (1) the flat dollar amount or (2)
the percentage of modified income amount. There is one final limi-
tation on the amount of the penalty. The amount of penalty paid in
a taxable year cannot exceed “the national average premium for
qualified health plans which have a bronze level of coverage” for
the taxpayer’s family size.49 It is currently unclear exactly how that
average will be determined. However, in a letter to Senator Olym-
pia Snowe, Douglas Elmendorf (Director of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO)) stated that the CBO estimated that, in 2016,
43. It is “modified” adjusted gross income because it takes the taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income and adds any tax-exempt interest and any foreign income that was exempted under
I.R.C. § 911. Id. § 5000A(c)(4)(C).
44. There is some ambiguity as to whether, in the joint return context, the taxpayer
includes the entire amount of gross income reported on the joint return or whether some
allocation is required. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 526.
45. When the taxpayer’s income exceeds a threshold amount by more than $122,500
($61,250 for married taxpayers filing separate returns), the taxpayer will not be allowed any
exemption deduction. I.R.C. § 151(d). In such circumstances, there is a question whether
the taxpayer’s household income will include the income of any dependents whose income
exceeds that threshold amount.
46. Id. § 5000A(c)(4)(A), (B). A taxpayer can qualify for an exemption deduction for
his spouse if a joint return has not been filed, the spouse has no gross income, and the
spouse is not the dependent of another person. Id. § 151(b). Note that an applicable individ-
ual whose household income is less than the amount required to file a return is not subject to
a penalty. Id. § 5000A(e)(2). Note also that the modified adjusted gross income of a depen-
dent who is required to file a tax return is included in the taxpayer’s household income
regardless of whether the dependent incurred a penalty. It would seem, therefore, that the
modified adjusted gross income of even such a dependent who is not an applicable individ-
ual (such as a person who has a religious objection to insurance) would be included in a
taxpayer’s household income.
47. Id. § 6012(a).
48. Id. § 6012(a)(1)(A)(iv).
49. Id. § 5000A(c)(1)(B). The Healthcare Reform Acts provide four levels of coverage
(Bronze, Silver, Gold and Platinum) depending on the benefits provided under the plan.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1) (2006). It
is unclear whether this limitation is applied monthly or annually. See Kahn, supra note 9, at
527.
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annual premiums for bronze plans would probably average be-
tween $4,500 and $5,000 for individuals and between $12,000 and
$12,500 for family policies.50
II. A TAX? A PENALTY? DOES IT MATTER?
There is a question of whether the mandate for a payment truly
is a “tax” rather than a penalty. As noted above, Congress repeat-
edly referred to the mandate as a “penalty,” not a tax, despite its
inclusion in the I.R.C. and its payment with an individual’s federal
income tax return.51 However, the original House bill referred to
the penalty and used the term “tax” fourteen times.52 On account of
political realities, the Senate version was passed by the House,
which referred to the mandate’s imposition only as a penalty and
avoided the use of the term “tax.”
This issue of whether the individual mandate was a tax or a pen-
alty became the key question in the Supreme Court decision. Once
a majority of the Court determined that Congress did not have the
power under the Commerce Clause to impose the mandate,53 the
mandate could only be saved with Congress’s taxing power.54
Prior to determining the constitutionality of the provision, the
Court first had to determine whether it even had authority to con-
sider the question.55 The Anti-Injunction Act bars any litigation that
attempts to restrain “the assessment or collection of any tax.”56 The
permitted procedure to challenge a tax requires the taxpayer to pay
the tax and then sue the government for a refund.57 Because no
50. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Olympia Snowe,
U.S. Senator (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftp
docs/108xx/doc10884/01-11-premiums_for_bronze_plan.pdf.
51. See supra text accompanying note 14.
52. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 501(a) (2009); see
also Willis & Chung, supra note 6, at 181.
53. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012). Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor would have upheld the provision under the Com-
merce Clause. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part). They joined Chief Justice Roberts in upholding the provision
under the taxing power. Id. at 2600. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito would have
struck down the mandate. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
54. Congress may “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
55. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84.
56. Tax Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
57. “[The Anti-Injunction Act’s] language could scarcely be more explicit . . . . The
Court has interpreted the principal purpose of this language to be the protection of the
Government’s need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of
pre-enforcement judicial interference, ‘and to require that the legal right to the disputed
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individual would be obliged to pay the individual mandate penalty
until 2014, the Supreme Court could have held that the Anti-In-
junction Act barred a decision until that time.
The Court, however, held that the mandate was a penalty, and
not a tax, for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.58 The Court
stressed that Congress called the mandate a “penalty” and held that
this label was determinative for purposes of the Anti-Injunction
Act.59 Thus, the Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act would not
bar consideration of whether Congress had the constitutional au-
thority to impose the individual mandate.60
One might think that this determination would also settle the
constitutional question of whether the taxing power authorizes
Congress to create the individual mandate—that is, if the mandate
was a penalty for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, then it must
also be a penalty, and thus cannot be a tax, for purposes of the
Constitution. However, Chief Justice Roberts, authoring the major-
ity opinion, stated that while what Congress called the mandate was
determinative for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, it was not
determinative for purposes of the Constitution.61 Thus, the Court
would look beyond the mere label to determine whether the man-
date was a penalty or tax for purposes of the Constitution.62
Chief Justice Roberts determined that, for constitutional pur-
poses, the mandate should be considered a tax.63 There are some
obvious considerations that support that conclusion. For example,
the penalty that is set out in the I.R.C., is enforced by the Internal
Revenue Service, and is payable on an individual’s federal income
tax return.64 Also, one of the elements for determining the amount
of the penalty is the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, a concept
used in the federal income tax system.65 Justice Roberts also noted
sums be determined in a suit for refund.’” Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736
(1974) (quoting Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)).
58. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84.
59. Id. at 2583.
60. Id. at 2584.
61. Id. at 2594.
62. Id. (“It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a ‘penalty,’ not a ‘tax.’
But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act . . . it does not
determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power. It
is up to Congress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it
makes sense to be guided by Congress’s choice of label on that question. That choice does
not, however, control whether an exaction is within Congress’s constitutional power to tax.”).
63. Id. at 2595.
64. Id. at 2594.
65. Id.
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that the provision has “the essential feature of any tax: it produces
at least some revenue for the Government.”66
Chief Justice Roberts noted that although the mandate clearly:
aims to induce the purchase of health insurance, it need not
be read to declare that failing to do so is unlawful. Neither the
Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to
not buying health insurance beyond requiring a payment to
the IRS. The Government agrees with that reading, confirm-
ing that if someone chooses to pay rather than obtain health
insurance, they have fully complied with the law.67
Essentially, Chief Justice Roberts viewed the mandate as a choice
between purchasing insurance and paying more in federal taxes.
Chief Justice Roberts therefore did not view the mandate as an ab-
solute requirement to purchase insurance. He noted that Congress
itself predicted that many millions of people would be subject to
the penalty for failing to purchase insurance, and he wrote that he
did not believe that Congress would so willingly acknowledge the
creation of several million “outlaws.”68 To the contrary, as the Arti-
cle will discuss later, labeling those who fail to comply with the
mandate as “outlaws” is a major objective of the penalty provision.
In their dissent, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito ar-
gued that the majority opinion was simply rewriting the statute.69
Essentially, they said that because Congress called it a penalty, it
should be considered a penalty, and not a tax, for purposes of the
Constitution.70 Countering some of the points discussed in the
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the dissent noted that (1)
other penalties are collected by the Internal Revenue Service,71 (2)
the mandate is also administered by the Department of Health and
Human Services, and (3) it is not unusual for penalties to vary
based on ability to pay.72
66. Id. Counter to this point is the fact that, although it is predicted that the provision
will raise some money, the main goal of the provision is not to raise revenue, but instead to
encourage people to purchase adequate health insurance. In fact, the government’s ultimate
purpose would be met if no person was subject to the penalty. Also, many transfers to the
government, including payments that are clearly true penalties and not a tax payment, also
raise revenue that is contributed to the general fisc.
67. Id. at 2596–97. This ignores the psychological consequences of being subject to a
“penalty.” See infra Part IV.C.
68. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597.
69. Id. at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. The dissent used I.R.C. § 527(j) (penalty for failure to make campaign finance dis-
closures) as an example. Id. at 2654.
72. Id.
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For purposes of this Article, it makes no difference that the Su-
preme Court ultimately determined that the insurance penalty is a
tax. On account of its enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service
and its payment on an individual’s federal income tax return, most
will view it as part of the overall tax system. The Supreme Court’s
decision has bolstered the perception that the mandate is part of
the tax system. However, some questions remain: is it a good idea to
use a tax penalty—as opposed to credits and deductions73—to en-
courage a behavior, and will the penalty system have an adverse
effect on taxpayer compliance?
III. THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE MANDATE
Why did Congress enact the penalty to seek to force people to
purchase insurance? The answer is quite straightforward.
Two of the goals of the healthcare reform were to disallow the
insurance companies’ practice of turning down individuals for cov-
erage based on prior medical history and to prevent insurance
companies from cancelling coverage for policyholders who become
seriously ill.74 However, if those were the only changes that Con-
gress made, the insurance industry likely would not survive for very
long. Insurance, in general, is about spreading risks among a large
group of people.75 That is, a large number of people put money
into a pool that is held by an insurance company. In the health
insurance model, most of the people in the pool will not suffer ma-
jor medical problems and thus will not receive a significant amount
of payout from the insurance company. However, some individuals
will have a serious illness, and the pool’s aggregate premiums will
cover those expenses. Thus, the premiums of the entire pool, both
the healthy and the sick, cover the medical expenses of the sick.
This arrangement only works if there are enough individuals in
the pool who pay premiums but do not require outlays, i.e., the
73. In common parlance, these two choices may be referred to as the choice between
sticks and carrots. See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the
Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 799 (2012).
74. Subject to limited exceptions, which do not include preexisting medical conditions,
insurers must accept any employer or individual that applies for health insurance coverage.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2006). Insurers may not adjust premiums for prior medical conditions.
Id. § 300gg-4(b)(1). Insurers may not have annual or lifetime limits on benefits. Id. § 300gg-
11. Finally, insurance companies may not cancel any coverage other than for fraud. Id.
§ 300gg-12.
75. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 1 (1986).
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healthy people.76 If a person knows that an insurance company can-
not refuse to cover him at any time, that person may not buy
insurance until he actually incurs an injury or illness that will cause
him to incur medical expenses.77 That is, a healthy person will have
little incentive to purchase health insurance unless and until he ac-
tually becomes ill. Thus, the pool, instead of being made up of both
the healthy and sick, would instead consist largely of those who re-
quire outlays from the insurance company. Obviously, if this were
so, premiums would skyrocket because the insurance company
would know that the pool of coverage is skewed towards the un-
healthy. In that event, even many of the sick would have little
incentive to buy insurance because their premiums would be high
enough to cover any medical expenses they would be likely to in-
cur.78 Insurance companies could not survive long in that
environment.
This situation arises because of what is referred to as adverse se-
lection.79 As described in an amici curiae brief in the Virginia
lawsuit challenging the healthcare reform:
This phenomenon of adverse selection is severely aggravated
when the government prohibits insurers from denying cover-
age outright to consumers with disabilities or preexisting
conditions, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2704. By itself, this prohibi-
tion would give consumers sharply increased economic
incentives to refrain from purchasing insurance until they be-
come seriously ill or injured—knowing that at that point
insurers would be barred from turning them away. Congress
recognized that, under such circumstances, premiums for in-
surance would rise so sharply that the requirement to accept
76. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Elenora E. Connors, Health Care Reform in Transition: Incre-
mental Insurance Reform Without an Individual Mandate, 303 JAMA 1188, 1188 (2010).
77. In fact, under this scenario, it is probably incorrect to describe the product as “insur-
ance” because insurance involves the coverage of some risk. Instead, each purchaser has the
certainty of receiving disbursement from the insurer.
78. See Gostin & Connors, supra note 76, at 1188–89. In effect, such insureds would not
purchase actual insurance coverage; they would merely prepay to the insurer the amount of
their anticipated medical expenses.
79. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 626–27 (1990) (“Assume
a particular good comes in many different qualities. If in a transaction one side but not the
other knows the quality in advance, the other side must worry that it will get an adverse
selection out of the entire population. The classic example of this is in life/health insurance.
If premiums are set at actuarially fair rates for the population as whole, insurance may be a
bad deal for healthy people, who then will refuse to buy. Only the sick and dying will sign up.
And premium rates must then be set to reflect this.”).
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individuals despite preexisting conditions could become
unsustainable.80
Congress enacted the individual mandate in an attempt to avoid
the adverse selection problem and nudge the healthy into the
health insurance pools.81 The mandate accomplishes this by tilting
the balance heavily towards buying health insurance for the vast
majority of people. Individuals who purchase sufficient health in-
surance are exempt from the penalty. If the amount of the penalty
is close to or greater than the cost of the insurance, then the indi-
vidual is likely to choose to purchase the insurance rather than to
pay the penalty. This is likely to be especially true for high-income
taxpayers for whom the penalty will be greater. The government’s
hope is that, because the individual is going to spend the money
one way or the other, the individual will choose to acquire health
insurance rather than pay a tax penalty for which he receives noth-
ing in return.82
Note that the penalty need not be equal to the cost of the insur-
ance to induce the individual to purchase it. The effect of
excluding the penalty from those who purchase the insurance is to
make the actual cost to the individual the difference between the
premium and the penalty that the individual otherwise would have
had to pay. An individual who might not have been willing to pay
the premium for the insurance may be willing to pay that
differential.83
80. Brief Amici Curiae of the March of Dimes Found. et. al. in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 3, Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010).
81. See Ezra Klein, How Does the Individual Mandate Work?, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 25,
2010, 11:55 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/03/how_does_the_in
dividual_mandat.html (“The theory behind the mandate is simple: It’s there to protect
against an insurance death spiral. Now that insurers can’t discriminate based on preexisting
conditions, it would be entirely possible for people to forgo insurance until, well, they de-
velop a medical condition. In that world, the bulk of the people buying insurance on the
exchanges are sick, and that makes the average premiums terrifically expensive. The man-
date is there to bring healthy people into the pool, which keeps average costs down and also
ensures that people aren’t riding free on the system by letting society pay when they get hit
by a bus.”).
82. If the individual ends up paying the penalty, the amount paid is not directly trans-
ferred to private insurance companies. While the penalty itself does not benefit insurance
companies, the Acts provide an indirect benefit to them. Government subsidies will be paid
indirectly to the insurance companies because the Healthcare Reform Acts created a federal
tax credit for premiums paid to such companies by certain individuals and families. See I.R.C.
§ 36B (2006).
83. For example, assume that health insurance costs $500, and the government imposes
a penalty of $300 on any individual who does not acquire mandated health insurance cover-
age. If the individual does not buy insurance, he or she will pay $300 to the government and
receive nothing in return; if the person buys insurance, he or she will avoid the penalty, pay
the insurance company $500, and receive insurance. Because the person will pay at least $300
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IV. IS THE MANDATE UNPRECEDENTED? (IS THE TAX PENALTY
REALLY THE SAME AS A CREDIT?)
As noted above, this provision appears to be the first of its kind to
impose an additional federal income tax amount for failure to
purchase a product or service. However, some have questioned
whether it is truly unprecedented or whether the I.R.C. already im-
poses additional taxation on individuals for failure to spend money
a certain way in the same manner as the shared responsibility tax
penalty.84
For example, Professor Len Burman argued that the individual
mandate penalty is nothing new. He stated:
Our tax returns are full of implicit mandates with huge penal-
ties—in the form of lost credits and deductions—for
noncompliance. The government wants us to donate to char-
ity, own a home, save for retirement, adopt a child, buy a
hybrid car . . . If we don’t, we pay more tax (a penalty).85
The gist of this argument is that the government creates financial
incentives to engage in certain behavior, and the form of the incen-
tives is irrelevant. But, there are reasons why the penalty tax is not
the same as a deduction or credit, and though there are also simi-
larities, the differences matter. These differences include: (1) the
penalty is an overall tax increase while a deduction or credit would
involve an overall tax decrease; (2) different distributional conse-
quences arise from the two systems; (3) there are different
psychological responses to the systems; and (4) the systems have
different effects on overall tax compliance. These differences are
sufficient to raise the issue of whether a penalty was the optimal
means of implementing the mandate. The following Sections dis-
cuss each of these differences.86
whether he or she does or does not buy insurance, the person will buy insurance as long as
the $500 health insurance is worth $200 to the individual.
84. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, If Mandate is Struck Down, Are Tax Incentives Next?, 135
TAX NOTES 14 (2012) (“The only difference between the mandate and your common tax
incentive is that Congress framed the incentive as a tax penalty instead of a tax break . . . . A
tax penalty and a tax incentive have the same economic impact on affected and unaffected
individuals.”).
85. Len Burman, Health Mandate: It’s Just a Tax Break in Disguise, CNNMONEY (Apr. 14,
2010, 6:59 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/14/pf/taxes/health_insurance_mandate/
index.htm (ellipsis in original).
86. The last difference is discussed infra Part V.D.
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A. Tax Increase v. Tax Decrease
When discussing whether the penalty is financially equivalent to
deductions or credits, commentators focus on the viewpoint of the
individual taxpayer.87 It is clear that, without offsetting adjustments,
they are not equivalent from the viewpoint of the government or
taxpayers as a whole. Granting a deduction or credit decreases gov-
ernment revenue; imposing a penalty increases it.88 Without a
corresponding reduction of taxes, the penalty is an additional bur-
den on taxpayers. Similarly, focusing on the taxpayers’ position as a
whole, the overall liability of taxpayers would be reduced with de-
ductions or credits and would not be reduced with a penalty.
B. Different Distributional Consequences
As noted above, superficially the two systems (i.e., a deduction/
credit versus a tax penalty) appear similar when one focuses on fi-
nancial consequences to taxpayers.89 Take for example the
charitable contribution deduction and compare two tax systems.
Under the first system, assume the government imposes a twenty
percent flat tax rate on all income and allows taxpayers to fully de-
duct any charitable contributions. A and B both earn $50,000 and
have no deductions other than charitable deductions. A donates
$10,000 to charity while B donates nothing. A begins with gross in-
come of $50,000 but is able to deduct the donated $10,000, leaving
A with taxable income of $40,000. A’s tax liability is $40,000 x
twenty percent, or $8,000. B has no deduction, so B’s taxable in-
come is the full $50,000. B’s tax liability is $50,000 x twenty percent,
or $10,000. Thus, even though A and B had the same gross income,
B paid $2,000 more in income taxes because he did not donate
anything to charity.
Of course, as a consequence of the contribution, B has more dis-
posable income remaining than A. After making the contribution,
A enjoys whatever value he or she derived from the charitable dona-
tion and has $32,000 of income left to use for purchasing whatever
87. See Burman, supra note 85.
88. The Congressional Budget Office expects the insurance penalty to raise an average
of approximately eight billion dollars a year over the 2017–2022 period. BANTHIN ET. AL.,
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT (2012), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-
19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty.pdf.
89. See also JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 88–89 (4th ed. 2008) (“The
point is that we are all in the tax game together, and what is a privilege to one group of
people ends up being a penalty to everyone else through higher tax rates.”).
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goods or services A may desire. Because B did not give away any of
his income, B has $40,000 of income left after taxes to use for
purchasing whatever goods or services B may desire. The reduced
tax burden that A obtained came with a price tag.
Using a penalty system without providing a deduction for charita-
ble contributions could achieve the same result by subjecting
taxpayers to a tax penalty for not making a required charitable do-
nation. Assume the penalty is calculated as a percentage of income,
similar to the way in which it is calculated in the new healthcare
law, and that it is imposed on any taxpayer who does not donate at
least $10,000 to charity. Because this system does not allow taxpay-
ers to deduct charitable contributions, the tax rate can be lower
than it was under the first system. For A to pay the same income tax
amount as in the hypothetical above, the tax rate would be set at
sixteen percent, rather than twenty percent. Because the system
does not allow deductions for charitable contributions, A’s taxable
income is $50,000. A’s tax liability is $50,000 x sixteen percent, or
$8,000. This is the same tax liability that A had in the first hypotheti-
cal where A was allowed a deduction for charitable donations, but
the tax rate was higher. Without consideration of the tax penalty
provision, B’s tax liability would also be $8,000 because B has the
same gross income as A. To impose an overall liability on B equal to
B’s liability under the deduction system, the tax penalty for failure
to make a donation must be set at four percent of income.
Thus, B would have $8,000 in “regular tax liability” (i.e., $50,000
x sixteen percent) plus a $2,000 ($50,000 x four percent) tax pen-
alty because B did not donate $10,000 to charity. B’s total tax
liability would be $10,000, just as it is in the first hypothetical.
However, there are several defects to the argument that the pen-
alty is justified because of a purported economic equivalency. One
problem is that the economic equivalence itself unravels when one
examines the two structures a bit closer. The second problem is that
even if there were economic equivalency, there is another element
of the penalty that makes it objectionable, and that element is not
present with the deduction or credit.
As to the first problem, the hypotheticals above proved exact eco-
nomic equivalence assuming each taxpayer earned $50,000 and was
subject to a flat rate of taxation. Of course, in the real world, not
everyone earns exactly $50,000, and our system imposes graduated
rates of taxation on taxpayers. So, for example, if instead of
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$50,000, the two taxpayers earned $80,000, the economic equiva-
lence would not work using the same sixteen percent rate for
general income plus a four percent tax penalty rate.90
The structure becomes more complex when graduated rates are
introduced and the two taxpayers have different amounts of in-
come. A deduction is worth more to those in higher brackets
because the tax savings depend on the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.
To maintain the economic equivalence between the deduction and
a tax penalty, the government would have to set a lower rate for the
penalty on higher bracket taxpayers to account for the fact that the
rate will be multiplied by a higher income figure. The penalty
would also have to take into account the larger benefit of a deduc-
tion to those in higher tax brackets. The task of designing a
formula for equating penalties with deductions would be formida-
ble and would add considerable complexity to tax forms and
administration.
The government could use a refundable tax credit, instead of a
deduction, to avoid the marginal bracket issue.91 For the credit to
be useful to low income individuals, it would have to be refundable.
For example, Congress could add a surtax of a specified dollar fig-
ure to all taxpayers earning more than a certain amount of income.
It could then also provide a tax credit, equal to the surtax, for any
taxpayer that purchases health insurance.92 Adding a surtax to a
taxpayer that is washed out by a credit of equal or nearly equal
amount is a nullity or a circuitous route to imposing a penalty on
the people who do not purchase health insurance, and it should be
regarded as such by the courts and policymakers. After eliminating
the surtax and the credit for those who purchase insurance, one is
left with nothing more or less than a penalty for those who have the
surtax and do not receive the credit. Those who state that the sur-
tax and credit device achieves economic equivalence with the
penalty system, and so demonstrates that a penalty is no different
90. Using the deduction model, A’s income tax would be $14,000 ($70,000 x twenty
percent). B’s income tax would be $16,000 ($80,000 x twenty percent). Using the tax penalty
model, A’s income tax would be $12,800 ($80,000 x sixteen percent), which is $1,200 less
than under the deduction model. B’s income tax would be the same as the deduction model,
$16,000 (($80,000 x sixteen percent) + ($80,000 x four percent)). To reach exact economic
equivalence, the general rate would have to be raised to 17.5 percent while the tax penalty
rate would be lowered to 2.5 percent.
91. A tax credit is deducted from a taxpayer’s tax liability whereas a tax deduction is
deducted from the taxpayer’s income. Therefore, each dollar of tax credit provides a full
dollar of benefit to the taxpayer whereas the benefit of each dollar of a deduction depends
on the taxpayer’s marginal tax bracket. DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAX 669 (6th ed. 2011).
92. See Sullivan, supra note 84 (maintaining that Congress could have adopted this ap-
proach and thereby obtained identical equivalence to the insurance penalty).
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from tax credits, ignore the time-honored concept of substance ver-
sus form. The very equivalence of the two approaches demonstrates
that both are penalties. If it is invalid to impose a penalty directly, it
will be equally invalid to use a surtax and credit system to impose a
penalty indirectly.
Instead of using the surtax method, which makes the true pur-
pose of the credit obvious, could Congress increase the tax rates at
certain levels and then provide a credit for purchasing health insur-
ance? While that is just another circuitous route to imposing a
penalty, it is more likely to be sustained by courts and policymakers
because it is much less obviously a subterfuge for imposing a tax
penalty. The problem is that it will be very difficult to design a struc-
ture that will exactly duplicate the current tax penalty provision,
which is based on either a flat amount or a percentage of income
but is subject to a ceiling of the average annual premium amount
for a certain level of health insurance. The rate increase would have
to kick in at the lower level of tax brackets (excluding those taxpay-
ers who are exempt from the mandate requirement because they
do not have enough income) in order to ensure that it reaches the
persons to be covered. Even a nominal raising of tax rates of those
in the lower tax brackets would invoke strong political opposition.
To make the tax credit equal to the additional tax raised by the
increase in rates, there would have to be a graduated credit,93 which
would make obvious that the purported credit system is actually a
disguised penalty system. If there are valid objections to the system,
they will apply regardless of the form employed. If the objections
center on the public’s perception of the system, then disguising it
could answer those complaints, but only if the disguise is successful.
C. Psychological Response Differences
Supporters of the penalty system might respond that they do not
need to show that a tax penalty is the exact economic equivalent of
a deduction. For purposes of their contention, they might argue
that the two are similar enough that they should be treated the
same. As noted by Professor Burman, since the government already
93. A graduated credit would be one that increases in size the more income a taxpayer
has. The current tax system has no such credit, although it has many credits that phase out as
a taxpayer’s income increases. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21 (dependent care credit).
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uses deductions and credits to affect behavior, why not use a pen-
alty for a similar purpose?94 While there is some force to that
argument, there are counter considerations.
Not every deduction or credit’s purpose is the subsidization of an
investment or an activity.95 There is no dispute, however, that many
deductions and credits serve that function.96 Because the I.R.C. al-
ready has provisions that are used for non-neutral reasons (i.e.,
reasons that have nothing to do with an accurate measurement of
net income), and because there is some economic similarity be-
tween deductions or credits and tax penalties, should it matter
whether the government’s intervention is in the form of a deduc-
tion or credit on the one hand, or a penalty on the other?
It should. The psychological impact of subsidization is very differ-
ent from the psychological impact of penalization. It is useful to
review what a deduction or credit actually does. Essentially, a de-
duction or credit reduces the cost of an expenditure, whether it be
a charitable contribution, a medical expense, or the purchase of a
hybrid car. By providing a deduction or credit, the government ef-
fectively shares the cost of the expenditure.97 For example, if a
taxpayer is in the twenty percent marginal tax bracket, then he or
she knows that a $10,000 deductible expense will only cost the tax-
payer a net of $8,000 (i.e., the $10,000 expense minus the $2,000 in
tax savings attributable to the $10,000 deduction). In a sense, the
government shares the cost of that expenditure by allowing the tax-
payer to save $2,000 in taxes because of the expense.
This helps explain why, psychologically, taxpayers view deduc-
tions and credits differently from tax penalties. In the credit and
deduction case, a taxpayer is not required to buy anything. A de-
duction or credit reduces the economic cost of the expenditure to
94. Burman, supra note 85.
95. An example of a deduction that is not designed to subsidize expenditures is the
ordinary business deduction under I.R.C. § 162, which is an element of net income measure-
ment. An example of a credit that is not designed as a subsidy is the credit allowed by I.R.C.
§ 21 for certain dependent care expenses. This credit is neutralizing a tax bias against a
second spouse’s employment that arises because of the exclusion of implied income from the
tax base. See Douglas A. Kahn, A Proposed Replacement of the Tax Expenditure Concept and a
Different Perspective on Accelerated Depreciation, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (man-
uscript at 8–9), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205288.
96. A clear example is the $7,500 credit provided for purchasing a qualified plug-in
electric car such as the Chevy Volt. See I.R.C. § 30D.
97. Whether or not one views this as a subsidy from the government is a separate issue.
See, e.g., David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income Tax System, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1247–48 (2011); see also Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax
Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992). There is no question that, by
providing a deduction or credit, the government is reducing the cost of the expenditure.
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the taxpayers, but the decision to make that expenditure feels com-
pletely voluntary. If a taxpayer determines not to make the
expenditure, he or she does not view the increased amount in tax
as a penalty. The taxpayer concludes instead that the reduced cost
of the expenditure is not sufficient for him to make that purchase.
By way of analogy, suppose a furniture store has a weekend sale
in which it offers to sell a $900 sofa for $450. Those individuals who
do not wish to buy the sofa, even at the reduced price, do not con-
sider themselves penalized by the store for not providing them with
the financial benefit enjoyed by those who take advantage of the
sale.
There is an argument that the sofa sale is not perfectly analogous
to the tax credit or deduction for health insurance. When a buyer
chooses not to purchase a discounted sofa, he suffers no direct or
indirect loss from that decision. One could argue that, by contrast,
when a taxpayer chooses not to buy health insurance for which a
tax subsidy is available, he may feel that he will directly pay more in
taxes (since he does not get the subsidy), or he will indirectly pay
more because other taxpayers will receive a subsidy when they buy
insurance (perhaps requiring the taxpayer to pay more in taxes to
cover the subsidy loss).
As to the first contention, if a credit is offered to anyone who
purchases insurance, those who do not purchase it have decided
that the reduced cost of the insurance (via the tax subsidy) is not
sufficient to make it something they are willing to buy. Since the
“bargain” is offered to everyone, if the taxpayer determines not to
buy the insurance even at the bargain price, then the taxpayer will
likely view himself as shrewd rather than harmed. In this sense, it is
similar to the person considering the purchase of the sofa.
As to the second contention, there are political restraints on the
extent to which taxes can be raised. Still, if a subsidy is used and tax
revenues are reduced, then it may result in reduced government
spending or more borrowing by the government. Any increased
borrowing will be a burden borne by all citizens, including those
who received the credit. Thus, it will be spread throughout a mas-
sive system. It is unlikely that a taxpayer will perceive the granting
of a tax credit as causing an increase in his individual tax burden,
even if the credit does increase that burden. Indeed, there are nu-
merous credits currently in the tax system, and it does not appear
that most taxpayers regard them as increasing their tax burden. In
the end, regardless of whether the analogy is perfect, it reflects the
perception of the public that the credit is merely a reduction of the
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cost of an item, and their choice is to buy it at the lower price or
not.
A penalty is not viewed in the same light as a tax subsidy. As
noted previously, the I.R.C. makes a point of characterizing the pay-
ment required of the non-insured as a penalty.98 A governmental
penalty carries with it the connotation that the person is a wrong-
doer.99 If an individual fails to make a charitable contribution, and
thus gets no deduction, that individual is not thereby made to feel
as if he or she is a wrongdoer. On the other hand, if the govern-
ment were to impose a penalty on those who do not make a
specified amount of charitable contributions, the citizens who fail
to contribute would be identified as bad citizens. The use of the
penalty system in the Healthcare Reform Acts is designed to induce
guilt in those who do not purchase sufficient medical coverage.100
One of the major objections, then, to the use of the penalty provi-
sion is that it is inappropriate for the government to mark as
miscreants those who chose not to invest in projects that the gov-
ernment likes.101
There is another reason why the government believes the use of
a penalty has a more compelling impact than would a credit or de-
duction. There is a different psychological impact to having dollars
taken from a person than there is to not giving him additional dol-
lars.102 For example, if a ticket for the Super Bowl would cost
$1,000, an individual might not be willing to pay that amount to
obtain the ticket. But, if the individual were given a ticket to the
Super Bowl, he might refuse an offer of $1,000 to purchase it. It
might seem that if the ticket is not worth $1,000 to him, he would
98. See supra Part I.
99. As is true with many words, the term “penalty” has different meanings in different
contexts. Imposed by a government, it means “a punishment fixed by law for a crime” or
“disadvantage, suffering, handicap, etc. imposed upon an offender, as a fine or forfeit.” See
WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1324 (Jean L. McKechnie ed., 2nd ed.
1979).
100. Cf. James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 850–52 (1998).
101. Chief Justice Roberts appears to have focused only on negative legal consequences
rather than the detrimental psychological effects of being subject to a penalty. See Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597 (2012). Chief Justice Roberts writes,
“Neither the Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying health
insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS. The Government agrees with that read-
ing, confirming that if someone chooses to pay rather than obtain health insurance, they
have fully complied with the law.” Id. This statement ignores the basic facts that we normally
do not subject people who have “fully complied with the law” to a penalty and that persons
who are penalized by the government are widely considered to have been punished for a
wrongful act or omission.
102. This phenomenon is referred to as the “endowment effect.” See Daniel Kahneman et
al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 55, 56–57 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004).
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be willing to sell it for $1,000. Yet, that is not necessarily so because
he will regard the opportunity to obtain cash differently from part-
ing with cash. That is, the loss of one’s wealth is felt more deeply
than the declining of an opportunity to increase it.103
Is the penalty system any different from the social security tax
system? Is that tax a mandate to require persons to save for their
retirement? Of course, one difference is that the insurance penalty
encourages a taxpayer to purchase a product from a private com-
pany, whereas social security payments must be made to the
government. Also, while the social security taxes are sometimes de-
scribed as a payment into a retirement fund, that notion is far from
true. There is no actual fund. The fund is a paper figure and does
not represent any actual assets.104 No one who pays into the social
security system has any rights (contractual or otherwise) to receive
any benefits.105 The government could legally cut off all of a per-
son’s social security benefits,106 although it would be a political
disaster to do that. The social security tax is just that, a tax like any
other, and it is not a purchase of contractual rights.
The degree to which an individual internalizes the guilt associ-
ated with a penalty will vary depending upon how heinously the
event that triggered the penalty is regarded. Offenses that are ma-
lum in se are considered more heinous than those that are malum
prohibitum. Even within the classification of malum prohibitum, some
acts have greater moral implications than others.107 If an individual
willfully fails to pay his income tax liability, then that can be seen as
harming taxpayers who thereby may have to pay a greater tax or
receive fewer governmental benefits. Accordingly, a willful failure
to pay or a willful avoidance of an income tax can be seen as moral
turpitude. That is not to say that it is on the same level of turpitude
as an act of violence, but it is certainly frowned upon by most of the
public.
To what extent would the public consider the failure to buy
health insurance an act of moral turpitude? To those who take seri-
ously the government’s contention that the failure to purchase
103. See id.
104. See Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Social Security, 3 ELDER L.J. 191, 192–94
(1995).
105. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960).
106. See Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51–53
(1986); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80 (1971).
107. Of course, an act ordinarily regarded as heinous can be considered laudatory under
special circumstances. For example, the willful killing of a human being is typically consid-
ered a heinous act. In certain circumstances, however, such as a mercy killing, some persons
regard it as laudatory.
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health insurance imposes a cost on the persons who do buy insur-
ance and on those who incur medical expenses, the wrongfulness is
comparable to that of willfully not paying one’s income tax liability.
Regardless of whether the failure to buy health insurance should be
so regarded, it is the actual perception of the act that creates the
internalizing of guilt. In any event, the government’s hope of in-
ducing compliance with the individual mandate must depend upon
the anticipation that most of the public will regard the imposition
of the penalty as a reflection of the moral turpitude involved in
failing to comply with the mandate.108
V. IS THE TAX PENALTY A GOOD IDEA?
A. It’s Not the Only Option
Whether or not one views the penalty as a departure from the
traditional tax system, there is still the separate question of whether
it is desirable to use a tax penalty in this way. One reason that Con-
gress may have chosen to use a tax penalty is that the I.R.C. already
provides a deduction for payment of health insurance premiums.
Medical expenses, including insurance premiums paid for health
insurance coverage,109 are deductible but only to the extent that
such expenses exceed ten percent of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross in-
come.110 Assuming a taxpayer’s medical expenses exceed ten
percent, the excess amount is classified as an itemized deduction
and therefore does not benefit the majority of taxpayers who use
the standard deduction. Thus, the usefulness of the medical ex-
pense deduction in encouraging taxpayers to purchase health
insurance is severely offset by the number of limitations that apply
to that deduction.
To the extent that a taxpayer’s payment of a health insurance
premium is deductible, that will reduce the cost of purchasing the
insurance coverage. While that might seem to encourage some tax-
payers to purchase insurance, the availability of the deduction has
108. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims
and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 217
(2012) (“[A] criminal law can stigmatize only if it has earned moral credibility with the com-
munity it governs. That is, for conviction to trigger community stigmatization, the law must
have earned a reputation with the community for accurately reflecting the community’s views
on what deserves moral condemnation.”).
109. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(D) (2011).
110. Id. § 213(a), (f). For years prior to 2017, the floor will be 7.5 percent of adjusted
gross income for taxpayers who are at least sixty-five years of age or who have a spouse who is
at least sixty-five years of age. Id. § 213(f).
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the counteracting force that encourages some taxpayers to self-in-
sure. The medical expense deduction allows a deduction for the
cost of actual medical expenses, thereby reducing the cost of such
expenses to those taxpayers who can use the deduction.111 Thus, a
taxpayer who is eligible to use the medical expense deduction may
be more willing to self-insure because the government will share in
any medical costs that such a taxpayer incurs.
While these two concepts seem to affect the taxpayer’s decision
to purchase health insurance, the limitations that apply to the med-
ical expense deduction likely make it so that relatively few taxpayers
are able to deduct any medical expenses at all.112 The limitations
therefore diminish, if not eliminate altogether, the cost-sharing ele-
ment of the deduction for health insurance premiums. However,
they also reduce, if not eliminate, the cost-sharing aspects for actual
future medical expenses, thereby increasing the value of having
medical insurance.
It is not true that Congress had to use a tax penalty merely be-
cause the traditional method of providing a deduction has been
ineffective in inducing a significant number of persons to purchase
health insurance. It is quite clear that the current system could have
been altered either by reducing the limitation on deductions or by
providing a credit for health insurance premiums to encourage tax-
payers to acquire adequate health care coverage.113
B. Is the Imposition of a Penalty an Undesirable Choice?
Given that other options were available, it is worth considering
whether the choice to use a penalty was the optimum one. The fo-
cus here is not on whether it is proper to impose a fee on the
uninsured but whether that fee is correctly imposed in the form of
a penalty. It is useful to consider whether the usual purposes for
imposing a pecuniary penalty apply. The classic use of a pecuniary
penalty is to punish undesirable behavior.114 The government
deems a certain behavior wrong and punishes those who engage in
111. See id. § 213(d).
112. In 2009, there were 140,494,127 individual income tax returns filed. Only 10,090,297
of those returns (or approximately seven percent) claimed a deduction for medical expenses.
See Internal Revenue Serv., 2009 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 19 tbl.1, 38 tbl.3 (2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11infallbulincome.pdf.
113. A tax increase or a reduction of governmental expenditure could offset any decrease
in government revenue, though the political reality is that neither of those is likely.
114. See supra note 99.
344 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:2
that behavior by imposing a penalty or fine. The goal of the penalty
is to deter that behavior.
In the instant situation, what is the bad behavior that the govern-
ment is penalizing? Supporters of the healthcare reform would
argue that the failure to purchase health insurance is bad behavior
for two reasons: (1) the person is a “free rider,” and so, despite not
acquiring health insurance, the person will still receive some free
medical care if she becomes ill; or (2) the person is engaging in
adverse selection and will defer purchasing health insurance until
she actually needs it.115
Upon further inspection, the free rider problem appears to be
grossly exaggerated, and there is a serious question as to whether a
penalty is the proper remedy for adverse selection. Each is now con-
sidered separately.
1. The Free Rider Issue
It is not the non-purchase of health insurance that causes the
alleged free rider problem, but the receipt of free medical care.
Consider three categories of people with different amounts of
wealth who are uninsured.
First, there is the wealthy individual who can afford to buy insur-
ance (that is, can afford to pay the insurance premiums) and can
also afford to pay for any medical care that is required. That person
will be required to pay for any medical services she receives.116
Clearly, that person is not a free rider. If a person is sufficiently
wealthy to self-insure, there is little justification for the government
to require her to purchase health insurance.117
Not only is the free rider argument inapplicable to such persons,
but the current design of the penalty in the Acts is at odds with that
argument since the penalty is graduated based on an individual’s
income level for the year.118 Normally in criminal law, the worse the
115. See Nicholas Bagley & Jill R. Horwitz, Why It’s Called the Affordable Care Act, 110 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 3 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/bag
leyhorwitz.pdf.
116. If it is true that hospitals do not collect amounts owed from people who could afford
to pay and thus some in this group may receive medical care for which they do not pay, that
is a problem with the hospital collection process; it is not a free-loading issue. See Douglas A.
Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Free Rider: A Justification for Mandatory Medical Insurance Under Health
Care Reform?, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 78, 81 (2011), http://www.michiganlawre
view.org/assets/fi/109/kahn.pdf.
117. Uninsured individuals directly pay over one-third of medical expenses they incur.
Brief of Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 12, Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2388).
118. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(B) (2011).
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behavior, the greater the penalty imposed. Yet, those with higher
income levels who decline to purchase insurance are not engaging
in worse behavior than those at lower levels. If the free rider argu-
ment is the justification for the penalty, then it would seem that the
opposite is true because those at lower income levels who do not
buy insurance but do receive medical care pass on their expenses,
while those at higher income levels do not.
Second, consider the circumstances of a low income individual
who cannot afford to pay for medical care (but, to an extent, will
still receive it if required) and also cannot afford to purchase health
insurance. Economists define a free rider as anyone “who receives
the benefit of a good but avoids paying for it.”119 Under that defini-
tion, this person constitutes a free rider.
However, that is not how the term is understood by the general
public, nor is it how the term is used by supporters of the health-
care reform, who use the term pejoratively. For them, the term
conjures an image of parasites obtaining medical care for which
they choose not to pay.120 Contrary to that picture, most of the pub-
lic do not have a negative view of the impecunious.121 In fact, the
Healthcare Reform Acts’ penalty provision itself reflects that view by
not imposing a penalty on any individual who cannot afford insur-
ance.122 In addition, as previously noted, the Healthcare Reform
Acts include provisions to provide subsidies for some individuals for
whom health insurance premiums would be a burdensome sacri-
fice.123 Even if individuals in this low-income group are considered
free riders, the healthcare reform does nothing to solve that “prob-
lem.” Individuals in this group will still receive free medical care
and hence will technically remain free riders.
The final uninsured category is economically situated between
the previous two. Those persons can afford to pay medical insur-
ance premiums but may not be able to afford the medical expenses
that would arise from a major illness or other health issue. This is
the one group of uninsured individuals that might fit the negative
connotation of a free rider.
119. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 222 (1998).
120. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 116.
121. It is a common view that the poor deserve sympathy rather than condemnation.
Many times, poverty is not necessarily the fault of the poor. See Sara Sternberg Greene, The
Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 544 (2013); see also JOSEPH STEIN, FIDDLER ON THE ROOF 21 (1964) (“I
realize of course it’s no shame to be poor, but it’s no great honor either.”).
122. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1) (2011).
123. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401, I.R.C. § 36B.
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In the absence of empirical evidence that this group is made up
of a significantly large number of people, there is a question of
whether the group is large enough to justify the enactment of such
a large-scale change in the healthcare industry. That decision rests
on value judgments over which reasonable people can disagree.
Aside from the size of the problem, however, there is an issue as
to whether this group truly presents a free-riding problem. Prior to
the enactment of the Healthcare Reform Acts, there were severe
limits as to how much free medical care an individual could re-
ceive.124 Thus, if uninsured individuals became seriously ill and
tried to acquire health insurance, they would find that it either
would be prohibitively expensive or would not cover preexisting
conditions. Those persons, therefore, would be taking a substantial
risk by not acquiring health insurance because there are limits on
the amount of free medical care available. While such persons will
receive medical care to stabilize their condition, they will not re-
ceive free long-term treatment for serious illnesses. Also, to the
extent that they have the means to pay for part of their care, they
will be required to do so.
Given the costs that this group can suffer by being uninsured, it
may be more accurate to view them as paying for their decision in a
meaningful, non-pecuniary form. They are not simply receiving the
benefit of a good they did not pay for. An additional reason for not
characterizing their behavior as reprehensible is described in Part
V.B.3.
2. The Adverse Selection Issue
Under the Healthcare Reform Acts, a person who could other-
wise afford insurance can decide not to buy insurance until
expensive medical services are needed because the insurer cannot
deny coverage for a reason other than fraud.125 These provisions of
the Healthcare Reform Acts create the adverse selection problem
described above.126 The program would fail if that problem were
not resolved, which justifies the Healthcare Reform Acts imposing a
price for non-coverage in order to induce the purchase of health
insurance. It might even justify having a graduated price to reflect
the different utility of money to those who have more of it. Yet, this
124. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (2006).
125. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(b)(2).
126. See supra Part III.
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additional price is not a penalty for bad behavior. Rather, it is an
imposition to change rational market decisions. Moreover, as noted
later, there were other options for dealing with that problem that
might have been preferable.
An individual who engages in adverse selection is acting ration-
ally. If the insurance system allows her to get medical coverage at
any time at premium rates that do not take into account her medi-
cal condition, it makes financial sense for her to wait until she has a
medical condition before purchasing insurance.
That does not mean that society should not deter that behavior.
As noted previously, the entire system would fail if steps were not
taken to discourage adverse selection. How then should the govern-
ment prevent this behavior? One simple answer is to increase the
cost for not purchasing insurance.127 The insurance penalty provi-
sion serves that goal. It imposes a price on an individual for failing
to acquire adequate health insurance. However, the characteriza-
tion of that price as a penalty does more than merely add a
financial burden. The use of that term imposes an additional cost
of internalized guilt for purportedly behaving badly.128 It is inappro-
priate to use an implicit sanction for bad behavior to induce people
to purchase insurance.
Should a person who engages in rational behavior be subjected
to a pejorative characterization by incurring a penalty for that be-
havior? As noted above, the term penalty has a psychological effect
on individuals that is different from other methods of increasing
costs. Since Congress chose to make the penalty unenforceable,129 it
may have relied on that psychological coercion as the means to in-
ducing compliance.
Instead of a penalty, the exaction could have been labeled a tax.
That would have been a more neutral term. As previously noted, tax
can be seen as an appropriate name for the requirement because it
is determined by the amount of adjusted gross income that a per-
son has, is set out in the tax code, and is administrated by the
Internal Revenue Service.130 Regardless of whether the imposition
can properly be regarded as a tax, that designation would not con-
demn the taxpayer’s behavior. Calling it a tax would meet the goal
127. There is a question as to whether the government can validly impose a cost for not
purchasing an item when the urgency for that purchase is created by the government itself. I
do not discuss that question in this Article.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 16–17.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 63–66.
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of increasing the cost of not having insurance without subjecting
the individual to the sanction of being identified as a wrongdoer.131
This attempt to increase the cost of an otherwise rational behav-
ior is not unique to the health care area, nor is it unusual to
designate the imposed cost as a penalty. Economists and govern-
ment policymakers are often concerned about externalities and use
penalties to force individuals to internalize the costs that they are
imposing on others. The classic example of this is the factory that
pollutes. Without some penalty, it is rational for the factory owner
to pollute because the cost of that pollution is imposed on someone
else, and avoiding the cost of reducing pollution increases profits.
So, a penalty for pollution is imposed to force factory owners to
reduce or eliminate the pollution that they otherwise would impose
on others.132 It is appropriate to characterize the imposition of that
cost as a penalty because the active conduct of the factory owners
harms others, and that violates a moral obligation.
Is the situation of medical insurance comparable to the pollution
problem? Does a person’s decision not to purchase insurance harm
others? If so, is the nature of the manner in which that harm is
imposed significantly different from the classical pollution problem
so that it does not violate any moral obligation? To answer those
questions, it is necessary to look at the situation before and after the
adoption of the Healthcare Reform Acts.
3. Prior to the Adoption of the Acts
The government and some commentators contend that, even
before the adoption of the Acts, a person’s failure to purchase in-
surance harmed others by raising the cost of insurance premiums
that priced some people out of the market. The reason that premi-
ums were increased was because the cost of medical care was raised
to pass on the cost of treating people who had no medical insur-
ance and who could not pay for their treatment.133
As previously noted, that problem has been grossly exaggerated.
Over a third of medical expenses incurred by the uninsured are
131. A penalty is imposed by a government for committing an unlawful and wrongful act.
See supra note 99. As noted in Part II, supporters of the Healthcare Reform Acts have argued
that the penalty should be considered a tax in order to support Congress’s authority in creat-
ing the tax penalty.
132. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(d) (2006) (imposing a penalty on those who
illegally discharge pollutants).
133. See Brief of Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13–15,
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398); see also
Bagley & Horwitz, supra note 115.
WINTER 2014] The Individual Mandate Tax Penalty 349
paid for directly by such individuals.134 Some portion of the other
expenses are likely imposed on individuals who also could not af-
ford to purchase medical insurance. It cannot be said that those
people are voluntarily passing on a cost to others. Rather, they are
persons of need. In recognition of that, the Healthcare Reform Acts
exclude many such persons from the mandate and provide a sub-
sidy for the others to help them purchase insurance.135 The cost of
those persons’ medical needs is still passed on to others under the
Acts. Those who are exempted from the mandate will pass their
medical expenses on to taxpayers or to those who pay for their ser-
vices, and the others will pass on part of the cost of their premiums
to the taxpayers. Only those who could afford to pay premiums
without incurring a hardship can be said to have chosen to pass on
their unpaid medical expenses to others, so only that minority
group can be thought of as approaching the situation of a polluter.
Yet, even that group is in a significantly different position from a
polluter.
First, it is not the absence of premium payments from the unin-
sured that affects the costs of those who purchase insurance. If the
uninsured did purchase insurance, their premiums would equal the
actuarial cost of insuring them, and so there would be no surplus to
reduce the premiums of others. There would be a problem if the
number of people purchasing insurance were not large enough to
provide confidence that the actuarially determined estimates of
payouts for that group would be realized. That problem does not
exist. The number of people purchasing insurance is more than
sufficient to permit the insurers to provide coverage, and that is
why insurance is readily available.
The problem caused by that minority of the uninsured arises if
and when they become ill and need medical services. If they fail to
pay the full cost of the services they receive, the shortfall is passed
on to those who pay for medical services. Those who could afford
insurance but deferred purchasing it until later in life when they
are older but still healthy have not affected anyone’s cost of medical
services.136
134. Brief of Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees, supra
note 117.
135. See I.R.C. §§ 36B, 5000A(e)(1) (2011).
136. The only group who will affect the medical costs of others are those who could
afford insurance and do incur significant medical expenses that they are unable to pay. The
method chosen by the government to prevent that consequence is to penalize all who do not
purchase insurance they could afford, even though many of those persons would not have
passed on any costs to others. As a matter of policy, it might have been better to have chosen
a method that penalized only those who actually caused a problem, but that is a subject for
another time and debate.
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The question that arises is whether an individual’s decision to
refrain from purchasing medical insurance harms those who do
purchase it. The contention that harm is imposed is based on focus-
ing on the group of people who do not purchase insurance (the
“non-purchasing group”) rather than on a single individual who
makes that choice. The “harm” can take place only if, when includ-
ing the non-purchasing group in the pool, the non-purchasing
group would pay a premium that is greater than the value that they
would receive. In other words, considering the effect ex post, the
non-purchasing group would receive a smaller amount of medical
benefits than they paid in premiums. On examination, it is clear
that that contention has no merit.
Applying the law of large numbers and making various assump-
tions about the pricing of the premiums, if the non-purchasing
group is large enough, then their premiums will be just adequate to
provide the medical benefits they receive—that is, they are in the
same position as the purchasing group and so none of their premi-
ums would affect the amount of premiums to be paid by the
purchasing group.
If the non-purchasing group is not large enough to provide rea-
sonable expectations that the medical benefits they would receive
will comport with the actuarial evaluation of a large group’s medi-
cal costs, then it is possible that ex post the non-purchasing group
will incur a smaller amount of medical expenses. Thus, the premi-
ums they would have paid would have reduced the premium cost of
the purchasing group. However, it is equally possible that ex post
the non-purchasing group will incur larger medical expenses and
will cause an increase in the premium cost of the purchasing group.
In other words, it is just as likely that the inclusion of the non-
purchasing group in the pool would increase the costs of the
purchasing group as it is that they would reduce those costs.
Adverse selection is not a factor here. The situation is one where
the insurance company is not obliged to accept applicants who are
unhealthy. They can refuse coverage or charge a larger premium to
reflect the additional risk that the applicant poses. To the extent
that an applicant may successfully hide information about poor
health, that is as true for people in the purchasing group as in the
non-purchasing group.
There is another consideration here. Assume, contrary to actual
facts, that somehow it was possible to predict that a non-purchasing
group would incur smaller medical costs ex post. If that were the
case, then the inclusion of that group into the pool would reduce
the premium cost of the purchasing group. But in what sense has
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the purchasing group been harmed by the refusal of the non-
purchasing group to overpay for the medical insurance they re-
ceive? The refusal to subsidize another’s costs may be seen as
reducing the latter’s assets, but it is a strange use of the term to say
that they have harmed others. If John refuses to give money to a
beggar, the beggar is poorer for not receiving those alms, but there
would be few people who would say that John has harmed the beg-
gar. If that constitutes harm, then everyone who fails to contribute
to any worthy organization can be said to have harmed the people
who benefit from that organization’s work. Even if the word “harm”
can be applied there, it would not be the kind of harm that would
warrant imposing a fine on the non-donor.
Even as to those uninsured who incur medical expenses they can-
not pay, one must consider the reason they did not purchase
insurance to determine if they are in a comparable position to a
polluter. The assumption advanced by the supporters of the penalty
system is that those persons consciously relied on the availability of
free medical services in deciding not to purchase insurance.137 This
assumption appears to be based on speculation rather than on em-
pirical data. There are good reasons to doubt the correctness of
that assumption. As noted previously, the quality and extent of the
medical services that are available for free are far less than the ser-
vices that the insured can receive.138 Hence, persons who declined
insurance in reliance on free coverage would be accepting a signifi-
cant risk as to the quality of services that would be available to
them. The existence of that element of risk reduces the likelihood
that many of the uninsured based their decision on the expectation
that free services would be available. Moreover, it is likely that many
of the uninsured in that minority class are young. Speculating as to
why many of the young do not purchase insurance,139 it seems likely
to be a product of two factors.
The young typically do not have large amounts of disposable in-
come, and so the payment of premiums would be a burden.
Moreover, the young are notoriously optimistic and believe them-
selves to be immune from illness and mortality. The young very
likely overly discount the possibility that they might need medical
137. See Jedediah Purdy & Neil S. Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The Minimum Coverage
Provision, Mill’s “Harm Principle,” and American Social Morality, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 374, 386
(2012).
138. See supra text accompanying note 124.
139. Some young persons are covered by their parents’ insurance, and some are covered
by insurance provided by their employers. The uninsured young are those not covered by
such plans and who do not choose to purchase insurance on their own.
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services before they are ready to purchase insurance.140 The deci-
sion of the young to forego insurance may very well be rational.
Even if it is not rational, it is a product of poor judgment. It is one
thing to punish bad behavior and quite another to punish the
young for poor judgment.
The minority of uninsured who cause an increase in costs to
others are in a very different position from polluters. The polluter
knows that he is imposing harm on others and does nothing to pre-
vent it. The uninsured simply made a judgment that the value of
insurance coverage was not worth what it would cost him at this
time of his life. That may be a sensible decision even if the likeli-
hood of needing future medical services were accurately
determined. Even if it is not a sensible decision, people are gener-
ally not punished for making poor choices that do not involve
affirmative action causing injury to others.141
There is another important distinction. The polluter’s injury to
others comes from actions that the polluter has taken. For example,
a polluter manufactures an item where the manufacturing process
dispenses pollution into the environment, adversely affecting
others. The wrong that is punished by the healthcare penalty is one
of inaction rather than an affirmative act. The uninsured choose
not to purchase an item. Even if one were to conclude that unin-
sured individuals’ decisions not to purchase insurance did harm to
others, it is an unusual step to punish people for choosing not to
buy something.
If someone chooses not to purchase a manufactured item, then
there will be negative consequences for others. The owner of the
item will be deprived of the profit from the sale that did not take
place. The manufacturer will sell fewer of its products and may have
to reduce its pool of employees. Some employees may lose their
employment. Consumers are not held responsible for the harm
others suffer because the consumers refrained from purchasing cer-
tain goods. This all goes to show that it is inappropriate to impose a
penalty, as contrasted with a tax, for a failure to purchase
insurance.
140. See Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks into
the Health-Insurance Pool with an Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 WIS.
L. REV. 79, 96–97 (2010).
141. Concededly, the sentence above reflects a libertarian viewpoint. There are state and
local laws that impose fines for failure to take certain precautions against harms, such as not
wearing a seatbelt or a helmet. Whatever one thinks of the appropriateness of such laws, it is
not likely that violators consider themselves (or are considered by others) to be bad people.
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4. Subsequent to the Adoption of the Acts
When effective, the Healthcare Reform Acts will require insurers
to provide insurance regardless of preexisting medical condi-
tions.142 As previously noted, if left unchecked, that would lead to
an adverse selection problem in which only the sick would purchase
insurance, and the industry would soon collapse.143 If the health
reform program is to succeed, it is necessary that the government
take steps to prevent adverse selection. The penalty arguably serves
that purpose.144 However, there remains the question of whether
the method chosen by the government (the Individual Mandate
and the penalty) is an appropriate vehicle. This question will be
discussed below.
C. The Inappropriateness of Using a Penalty
If the government wishes to support an industry for the public
good, it may do so, but the manner in which the government sup-
ports the industry is subject to scrutiny. The government can use
tax revenues to support an industry. The government can use de-
ductions and credits to encourage consumers to purchase an
industry’s products (an incentivizing carrot as contrasted to a prod-
ding stick). When the government chooses to support an industry
by adopting a penalty (i.e., a stick) to punish those who do not
purchase its products, it becomes a matter of concern and warrants
especially careful scrutiny, like that given to direct expenditures,
because, unlike the subsidy, the penalty carries with it a negative
characterization. The material below examines whether the man-
ner in which the government structured its program in the
Healthcare Reform Acts was undesirable.
Congress could have adopted a national health program to
which all must belong, a national insurance program to which all
must belong, or a national insurance program to which all who do
not have a minimum level of insurance must belong. Those pro-
grams could have been financed with taxes. It seems likely that the
supporters of the Healthcare Reform Acts would have preferred to
adopt one of those choices but lacked the political support to take
that route.145 The problem is not so much with what Congress
142. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2006).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81.
144. There is a question whether the size of the penalty is adequate for that purpose.
145. See JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT INTO IT
AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT 79 (2007).
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sought to accomplish, but how it went about implementing its pro-
gram. The Individual Mandate offends libertarians who resent
being required to purchase something even when they might wish
to make that purchase. Even those who are not libertarians may
chafe at being told to purchase an item. The Acts compound that
problem by using a penalty to enforce the mandate. While the use
of a penalty may more effectively cause individuals to internalize
the cost of their not purchasing insurance, it is inappropriate to
characterize those who do not purchase insurance as miscreants.
Governmental paternalism is not unusual, and many such pro-
grams exist. There is little dispute that medical care is in great need
of reform and that it is legitimate for the government to address
that problem.146 One concern is whether the manner in which the
Healthcare Reform Acts operate will set a precedent that opens the
door to other governmental mandates overriding personal choices.
If the government determines that it is in the national interest that
the newspaper industry should thrive, can it mandate that everyone
purchase newspapers or be subjected to a tax penalty? Could it or-
der people to purchase a minimum amount of life insurance?147
After all, everyone will die. The supporters of the Healthcare Re-
form Acts argue that medical care differs from other items because
everyone becomes ill at some time in life.148 In fact, not everyone
does require major medical treatment during his or her life, but
everyone does die.
While there are political limitations on what the government is
likely to do, the public as well as the courts should be aware that
once the concept is established that the government can dictate
what are considered to be personal choices, it might be encouraged
to broaden its reach. If the political process is one of the checks on
abusive use of governmental power, it is especially important that
the public consider the ramifications of the manner in which this
program is implemented. The history of the expansion of the fed-
eral government’s use of its power over the last eighty years does
146. One objection to the Healthcare Reform Acts is that while they addressed some
existing healthcare problems, they did little or nothing to deal with the spiraling costs of
medical care, which many consider to be the most important of their problems. See Douglas
A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Unaffordable Health Act: A Response to Professors Bagley and
Horwitz, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 22 (2011) (citing David Brooks, Death and
Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at A23).
147. Justice Scalia asked if the government could force everyone to exercise because that
would improve health and reduce medical expenses. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 42,
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
148. See Brief of Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note
133, at 7.
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not inspire confidence that the government will exercise restraint
in utilizing this precedent.
There is another aspect to the design of the program that is likely
to cause resentment. The Healthcare Reform Acts place a ceiling
on the amount of premium that insurers can charge an insured.
The maximum premium cannot be greater than three times the
lowest premium the insurer charges anyone with the same smoking
status and in the same rating area.149 The actuarial cost of providing
insurance to the elderly is much greater than the actuarial cost of
providing insurance to the young and healthy because the elderly
are more prone to illnesses. The ceiling that the Healthcare Re-
form Acts imposes results in requiring insurers to provide
premiums for the elderly that are substantially less than the actua-
rial cost of providing insurance coverage for them. The only way
that the insurers can make up for that shortfall is to charge the
young much higher premiums than their actuarial cost. The conse-
quence of this shifting of the cost of the insurance is to require the
young to subsidize the premiums paid by the elderly.
It is a necessary element of an income tax system that it imposes
redistribution of wealth. Taxpayers will not receive the same dollar
amount of benefit from the government that they pay to the gov-
ernment in taxes. Some will receive more, and some will receive
less. Even taxpayers who are aware of that redistribution generally
accept it. However, the young, who will often find it burdensome to
pay insurance premiums, may bristle at having to subsidize the eld-
erly in addition to paying for the cost of their own insurance
coverage.
Some supporters of the program (and Justice Ginsburg) have
proposed that the young should not mind subsidizing the elderly
because they will be subsidized in turn later when they become eld-
erly.150 The young could look at their subsidization of the elderly as
a kind of down payment on their own expenses. Perhaps some
youths will find that prospect convincing, but there are a number of
countervailing considerations. There is considerable opposition to
the Healthcare Reform Acts, and the Acts may not be in existence
when the young could hope to be subsidized. Even if the Health-
care Reform Acts remain in force, the provisions may be modified
to eliminate a subsidy for the elderly. Some young may not live long
enough to qualify for that subsidy. In addition, there is the matter
149. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)
(2006).
150. See Bagley & Horwitz, supra note 115, at 6; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
147, at 57–59.
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of the time value of money. The dollars that the young pay now to
subsidize the elderly are worth more than the present value of the
same number of dollars that might be received many years in the
future. Moreover, dollars have different utility values depending
upon how many one has and what expenses one needs to incur.
The utility of dollars to the young usually will be higher than to the
elderly. Requiring the young to use their dollars to subsidize others
when their dollars have the highest utility may not seem a good
bargain to them.
D. Should the Penalty be Part of the Tax System?
Leaving aside the question of the use of the penalty for a mo-
ment, consider whether it was a mistake to utilize the tax system to
administer it. While the program can be seen as providing financ-
ing to grant insurance to all who desire it, the manner in which it is
conducted appears to force people to purchase something that they
may not want. As previously noted, the paternalistic appearance of
the mandate and the imposition of a penalty raise the resentment
of many people.151
What effect may the Healthcare Reform Acts have on the tax sys-
tem? The United States relies heavily on voluntary compliance. The
question is whether adding a controversial social program to the
income tax system will have a negative impact on the public’s view
of the tax system and thereby affect compliance. Moreover, it im-
poses a significant burden on the Internal Revenue Service to
administer the program. Anger over the imposition of a tax penalty
is likely to attach to the tax system that is associated with it. The fact
that there are a large number of persons who dislike the health
reform program increases the risk that their anger will spill over to
the agency administering the mandate.
It is doubtful that the tax system will suffer greatly because of its
relationship to this program, but it is an added burden on an
agency that already is heavily loaded. While there are obvious ad-
vantages to using the tax system to enforce the mandate (because
the administrative system is already in place), it does not seem that
Congress sought to balance those advantages with the costs.
Relatedly, as a former Service commissioner under Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson and founder of the Caplin & Drysdale law
firm said:
151. See supra Part V.C.
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I’m a critic of new chores continuously imposed on the IRS to
police social and economic policies . . . . The IRS has become
the easy way out. Its resources are spread thinly, and its em-
ployees face issues totally unrelated to tax backgrounds and
skills.152
Thus, in this circumstance, not only was the use of a tax penalty a
bad idea, but the concept of using the tax system should be care-
fully considered before being utilized in this manner in the future.
CONCLUSION
There are obvious benefits and costs associated with the adop-
tion of the health reform program, which establishes an insurance
scheme providing near universal coverage. Congress weighed those
competing attributes and decided to adopt the program. To fi-
nance the program, Congress chose to use the individual mandate
and to require the young to subsidize the premiums of the elderly.
To enforce the mandate, Congress adopted a penalty provision that
is administered by the Internal Revenue Service. Although the ad-
vantages of utilizing a penalty, rather than adopting a credit or
deduction system, are obvious, the costs are more subtle and re-
quire some inquiry and thought to bring them into view. A major
purpose of this Article is to disclose the detriment to the adminis-
tration of the tax system that results from using a tax penalty as the
means of implementing the health care insurance program. This
information could influence subsequent reforms of the health care
system and the question of whether a penalty should be used to
implement other programs in the future. The impact on the tax
system by using the Internal Revenue Service to collect the penalty
and of including the mandate in the I.R.C. adds to the cost of im-
posing a penalty. The potential injury to the perception of the tax
system might well make it worthwhile to utilize another agency to
collect the penalty, even though that would increase the cost of
administration.
Alternatively, Congress might replace the individual mandate
with a carrot of a refundable credit that is reduced as income rises.
While a credit system will not achieve the same result as the man-
date, it would serve much of the function of that program and
would be far more acceptable to the public.
152. Jeremiah Coder, The New IRS: Expanding the Mission?, 128 TAX NOTES 576, 579
(2010) (quoting Mortimer Caplin).
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It is likely that the Acts will be amended from time to time as
problems are discovered. When those reexaminations take place,
one hopes that the reformers will give consideration to substituting
a different means of implementing the goals of the Acts.
